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I. INTRODUCTION 
In September 2015, a United States (“U.S.”) drone strike destroyed two houses in Mosul, Iraq, 
killing four civilians.1,2 Basim Razzo, a former engineering student at Western Michigan University 
who moved to Iraq to care for his elderly mother, was one of only two survivors.3 Mr. Razzo assisted 
U.S. military troops when they set up a base across the street from his house in 2003, only to lose his 
wife, daughter, brother, and sister-in-law, as well as his house and countless valuable possessions and 
mementos at the hands of the U.S. military twelve years later.4 
A recent New York Times article highlighted the plight of such innocent civilian victims of 
drone strikes by U.S. forces. The article explained how gaps in U.S. military intelligence can lead to 
drone strikes being authorized on targets that are not affiliated with terrorist leaders or operations in 
any way, and surprised many Americans by detailing the difficulties foreign civilians face when 
attempting to receive compensation from the U.S. government for such failures and destruction. 
Powerful drone strikes have obliterated civilian houses, destroyed crops, torn innocent families apart, 
and caused untold amounts of property damage. 
Civilian deaths caused by the U.S. drone program abroad breed resentment among foreign 
populations, undermining the United States’ efforts to gain support from local populations in its 
global “War on Terror”. Despite acknowledging the benefits of compensating civilians for their losses 
caused by drone strikes and other military actions, the U.S. military relies on a complicated patchwork 
of programs in order to do so. This piecemeal approach to military accountability to foreign civilians 
delineates between compensating civilian victims for things like property loss and medical treatment, 
                                                          
1 Azmat Khan & Anand Gopal, The Uncounted, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/11/16/magazine/uncounted-civilian-casualties-iraq-
airstrikes.html?_r=0 
2 All citations in this paper have omitted internal quotation marks and citations, unless indicated otherwise. Some 
internal citations are included for purposes of demonstrating strength of authority. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
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and offering condolence payments to the families of civilian victims who have been killed by U.S. 
military action. The fragmented approach also differentiates between harm caused during combat 
operations, and harm caused outside the combat context. For civilians trying to navigate this 
complicated system, this means that similar claims are handled in wildly different ways with no 
adequate explanation, leading to further confusion and resentment. 
This paper will examine the history of compensation and condolence payment programs in 
the U.S. military, beginning with the Foreign Claims Act arising out of the military’s experience in 
World War I, and the introduction of solatia payments during the Korean War. We will also explore 
the use of these programs in the “War on Terror” and consider how the utilization of these programs 
currently serves to frustrate both the programs’ goals and the U.S. military’s objectives. 
In addition, this paper will review U.S. policies regarding drone strikes, embodied in the U.S. 
military’s targeted killing program. This review will consist of an analysis of the targeted killing 
program under international law in order to determine whether the program is carried out in a lawful 
manner. The two major branches of international law are Human Rights Law and International 
Humanitarian Law, and we will see that the U.S. military’s targeted killing program is unlawful when 
considered under either paradigm. 
Finally, this paper will examine the use of compensation and condolence payments in relation 
to the U.S. military’s use of drones. We will examine the obligations the U.S. military has to civilian 
victims of drone strikes under international law, if any. Furthermore, we will perform a case study in 
order to examine the difficulties faced even by those whose victimization cannot be seriously 
questioned. Finally, we will examine current standards for determining how compensation and 
condolence payment programs are administered, and make suggestions for the future. By the end of 
this paper, it will be clear that the U.S. military’s fragmented approach to military accountability 
undermines the programs’ goals of fostering positive relations with foreign civilian populations, is 
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antithetical to the military’s objectives (especially in the counterinsurgency context), and requires a 
systematic overhaul and coordinated approach amongst programs. 
II. CONDOLENCE AND COMPENSATION PAYMENT PROGRAMS 
The U.S., like every other country in the world, is under no legal obligation to provide 
compensation to foreign civilians for collateral damage arising from legal activities during armed 
conflict.5 However, as a global power with military units stationed around the globe, it is 
advantageous to maintain healthy relationships with the civilians of countries where there is a U.S. 
military presence.6 
Especially in the counterinsurgency context, the support of local populations is crucial.7 A 
citizen whose crops are run over or whose car is damaged by a U.S. military vehicle will naturally be 
upset and seek compensation for the damage caused to their property. Likewise, a citizen whose 
family member is killed by U.S. military troops who claim to be democratic liberators will expect 
some expression of condolences from the military force responsible for their pain and suffering. 
The failure to compensate civilians for property damage or express condolences for the 
accidental killing of an innocent civilian will make those civilians who feel wronged more likely to 
harbor ill feelings against the U.S. military and therefore support the enemy, making military 
operations much more difficult. Over the past century, the U.S. military has designed programs to 
right the accidental wrongs committed by U.S. troops. These programs fall under two main categories: 
condolence payment programs and compensation payment programs. 
 
                                                          
5 U.S. Dep’t of Def., DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL para. 5.17.5.1 (June 2015) 
6 See Major Katharine M. E. Adams, A Permanent Framework for Condolence Payments in Armed Conflict: A 
Vital Commander’s Tool, 224 Mil. L. Rev. 314, 343 (2016) (The U.S. military has recognized that in other 
countries where the U.S. military has had a presence for an elongated period of time, like Korea and Japan, it is in 
the military’s interest to maintain good relations with local populations. “The presence of the United States in Iraq 
and Afghanistan has been so prolonged, the same considerations should apply. In fact, these considerations should 
apply [whenever] U.S. forces must maintain the support of the local population.”) 
7 See Id. at 316 (Using compensation and condolence payment programs to maintain positive relations during 
counterinsurgency operations is strategically advantageous.) 
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A. MAIN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CONDOLENCE AND COMPENSATION PAYMENT 
PROGRAMS 
 
U.S. military programs that allow for payments to foreign civilians harmed by the U.S. 
military can be broadly categorized as either condolence or compensation payment programs. 
Compensation payment programs attempt to “make a victim whole for their loss.”8 
Compensation payment programs therefore act like a kind of insurance system, with the amount 
distributed by the military directly determined by the amount of “damages” suffered by the civilian.9 
When the system works as intended, the amount distributed is carefully calculated according to the 
local economy.10 
The Army regulation that interprets and applies the main compensation payment program, the 
Federal Claims Act (the “FCA”),  uses language that furthers the insurance system comparison and 
requires that any payment administered be reduced by the amount that can be recovered by the civilian 
via applicable insurance coverage.11 The FCA is “explicitly prohibited” from awarding compensation 
“based solely on compassionate grounds, placing the FCA squarely in the realm of compensation out 
of a sense of legal or policy-based obligation, and not as a mere expression of condolence for a loss.”12 
Condolence payment programs, on the other hand, are intended only as a display of sympathy 
for the civilian’s loss and “in no way constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity exposing the United 
States to legal suit.”13 Even though the U.S. military is under no obligation to offer condolences to 
the loved ones of innocent civilian victims killed by U.S. military actions, many have argued that the 
                                                          
8 Id. at 320 
9 See Cora Currier, Our Condolences: How the U.S. Paid for Death and Damage in Afghanistan, THE INTERCEPT 
(Feb. 27, 2015), https://theintercept.com/2015/02/27/payments-civilians-afghanistan/ (Claims for injuries 
incorporate aspects of damages similar to those used in the U.S. legal system, like cost of medical care, the 
victim’s earning potential, and more.) 
10 See Id. (Military officers conduct research to determine the amount necessary to satisfy a claim, asking 
questions as specific as “What’s a chicken worth in my area versus what it’s worth in downtown Kabul?”.) 
11 See Adams, supra note 6, at 328 (The regulation uses terms like “damages” and “entitlement to compensation” 
when discussing factors used to calculate compensation amounts to be paid.) 
12 Id.  
13 Id. at 343 
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U.S. has a moral duty to do so.14 Furthermore, the international community is beginning to consider 
the practice an “emerging norm in international law.”15  
B. COMPENSATION PAYMENT PROGRAMS 
1. The FCA 
The U.S. military has one permanent compensation payment program, the FCA.16 The purpose 
of the legislation is to “promote and maintain friendly relations” between the U.S. and “host 
countries” via swift settlement of meritorious claims when the U.S. military has caused harm in a 
foreign country.17 Foreign countries, their political subdivisions, and civilian residents thereof are all 
allowed to file claims under the FCA for personal injury, death, or damage to either real or personal 
property.18 
A major limitation of the FCA, however, is that it does not cover harm arising from combat 
operations.19 As a result, the FCA does not cover damage caused by troops who accidentally destroy 
property or kill civilians while in firefights with groups like ISIS in urban settings where civilian 
populations are often present in large numbers.20 This is a major problem when fighting against 
groups like ISIS in the counterinsurgency context because “[e]xposing innocents to harm is at the 
                                                          
14 Id. at 344; see Harvard International Human Rights Law Clinic, Frequently Asked Questions on Amends, 
CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT (2013), https://civiliansinconflict.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/Amends_FAQ_2013.pdf (Discussing the moral imperative for offering condolences, 
U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy said in 2009 that “To not [do so], I think, goes to our very conscience and our very 
morality.”)  
15 See Adams, supra note 6, at 344 (“Amends are beginning to be recognized at the United Nations.” 2010 and 
2012 U.N. reports “describe the making of amends as an emerging norm in international law … The 2010 report 
of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings called on the international community to pay 
attention to the emerging practice of making amends”.) 
16 Foreign Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (2006) 
17 Adams, supra note 6, at 320 
18 Foreign Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (2006) 
19 Id. 
20 See Currier, supra note 9 (The FCA “only covers incidents that happen outside of combat situations – meaning 
that civilians caught up in battles have no recourse.”) 
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core of their tactics, and exaggerating those harms to generate public outrage is at the front of their 
playbook.”21 
This exception is known as the combat activity exclusion, and it “prohibits payment of claims 
related to harm caused by ‘activities resulting directly or indirectly from action by the enemy, or by 
the Armed Forces of the United States engaged in armed conflict, or in immediate preparation for 
impending armed conflict.’”22 The combat activity exclusion is a constant source of controversy and 
confusion, both with civilians and U.S. military troops.23 
The fact that the combat activity exclusion exists and causes such frustration is a testament to 
the fact that the FCA and its predecessor were designed and enacted to address problems caused by a 
different type of warfare in a distant era.24 As World War I was coming to a close, “General John J. 
Pershing, the leader of the American Expeditionary Force, sent a telegram to the U.S. Congress 
requesting legislation that would allow the U.S. military to pay for injuries and damages that it 
inflicted upon French civilians and their property.”25 This request resulted in passage of the 1918 
Indemnity Act,26 which was enacted to address damage caused by U.S. military soldiers stationed 
“far behind the front lines” during World War I.27 The Indemnity Act was therefore not concerned 
with combat-related damage to civilians or their property, but rather, with damage caused by U.S. 
                                                          
21 See Robert Malley & Stephen Pomper, An Accounting for the Uncounted, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 16, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/12/isis-obama-civilian-casualties/548501/ (ISIS has “hid 
among civilians, used them as human shields, and [done what it needs] to do either to deter coalition airstrikes or 
ensure they would come at high cost.”) 
22 Adams, supra note 6, at 321-22 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Army, Reg. 27-20, Claims (Feb. 8, 2008)) 
23 See Id. at 321 (A civilian whose car was destroyed by a drone strike doesn’t care whether the military was 
engaged in legitimate combat activities, he “simply wants compensation.” Similarly, the exclusion is a “major 
source of frustration” for U.S. military units “seeking to maintain the support of local national populations.”) 
24 See Id. at 328 (The FCA and its predecessor “are creatures of the world wars of the last century, traditional wars 
with clear front lines.”) (citing John Fabian Witt, Form and Substance in the Law of Counterinsurgency Damages, 
41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1455, 1460 (2008)) 
25 Christopher V. Daming, When in Rome: Analyzing the Local Law and Custom Provision of the Foreign Claims 
Act, 39 Wash. U.J.L. & Pol’y 309, 311 (2012), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol39/iss1/10/  
26 Indemnity Act (American Forces Abroad), ch. 57, Pub. L. No. 65-133, 40 Stat. 532 (1918), repealed by Act of 
Apr. 22, 1943, 57 Stat. 66, § 5 (1943) 
27 Adams, supra note 6, at 328-29  
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military troops conducting non-combat activities (often involving the newest technology of the day, 
the automobile) like driving from one military camp to another.28 
During World War II, the U.S. planned to station troops in Iceland, “far from any front 
lines”.29 However, the Prime Minister of Iceland would only agree to allow U.S. military troops to be 
stationed in the country if the U.S. agreed to reimburse Icelandic citizens for any damage caused by 
U.S. troops.30 President Franklin Roosevelt agreed to this condition and quickly moved to update the 
1918 Indemnity Act, which resulted in passage of the FCA.31 
This historical background shows that the U.S. passed the FCA to address damage caused 
negligently by U.S. soldiers in foreign countries “far behind the front lines and unrelated to combat.”32 
The FCA was never intended for use in modern counterinsurgency operations which lack clear front 
lines and involve intentional exposure of civilians to harm. As a result, application of the FCA to 
civilian claims in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, and Pakistan has “strained the FCA to the 
breaking point” as U.S. military troops attempt to fit a square peg in a round hole.33 
The U.S. military’s attempt to solve modern-day issues with decades-old legislation has 
resulted in “haphazard application” as different U.S. military troops have interpreted the combat 
activity exclusion in varying narrow or broad ways, “often depending on how motivated they are to 
pay a certain claim.”34 This inconsistent application of the law has had the opposite of the intended 
                                                          
28 See Witt, supra note 24 at 1459-60 (“During the year and a half of its involvement in [World War I], the United 
States floated more than 100,000 motor vehicles across the Atlantic. The cars and trucks America had so 
successfully delivered to the western front quickly began to cause mayhem. Soldiers were driving motorized 
vehicles on roads built for horse-drawn vehicles in towns accustomed to horse-drawn speeds. The situation was a 
prescription for injury and accidental death. The carnage was so great that it even affected those who were sent to 
try to resolve it. In May 1916, an auto accident took the life of the British officer charged with compensating 
French civilians injured by British army vehicles.”) 
29 Adams, supra note 6, at 329 
30 Id.  
31 Id.; see Daming, supra note 25, at 316-17 
32 Adams, supra note 6, at 329 
33 Id. at 330 
34 Id. at 321 
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affect and led to resentment of the U.S. among some civilian populations.35 As one organization which 
closely monitors the military’s interactions with civilians has noted: 
Approach varies greatly between units. Some seem to be interpreting 
and executing policy in a manner intended to offer as much assistance 
as allowed to civilians mistakenly caught up in combat operations. This 
is a positive signal that some U.S. troops understand the strategic and 
moral imperatives of providing [compensation for harm caused by U.S. 
troops]. Unfortunately, a number of units took the opposite stance and 
declined any assistance whatsoever, no matter the apparent validity of 
the claim.36 
 
Members of the military directly responsible for handling claims brought by civilians under 
the FCA have voiced similar concerns.37 Although it would be fiscally impossible for the U.S. military 
to pay for “every act of destruction carried out during armed conflict, war being destructive by 
nature”, inconsistent application of an offered solution to civilians’ dissatisfaction with U.S. troops’ 
behavior only serves to frustrate and anger civilian populations, transforming a potential solution into 
another source of civilian dissatisfaction.38 
2. United States Agency for International Development Programs 
Inconsistent application and the combat activity exclusion have caused U.S. military troops to 
turn to ad hoc systems to resolve civilian claims when necessary. U.S. military troops stationed in 
                                                          
35 Id. at 323 
36 Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict, UNITED STATES MILITARY COMPENSATION TO CIVILIANS IN 
ARMED CONFLICT 7 (May 2010), 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/A8F90B05D58DDE504925773B001EB07C-
Full_Report.pdf 
37 See Adams, supra note 6, at 323 (“As one judge advocate noted, ‘Unfortunately, the use of the combat 
exclusion can undermine support of U.S. military efforts from the local population. In much the same way that 
payment of claims can create goodwill and a positive perception of U.S. forces, denial of payment can have the 
opposite effect. While any claimant who is denied compensation will be upset and dissatisfied, the situation can 
become exponentially worse when a claimant is denied compensation due to improper analysis or lack of 
sufficient investigation. While the claimant may not immediately realize that his claims was improperly 
adjudicated, subsequent discussions with other successful claimants may reveal inconsistencies between [units 
handling claims]. These inconsistencies ultimately result in distrust of the foreign claims system and U.S. 
forces.’”) 
38 Id. at 324 
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Grenada have turned to the United States Agency for International Development (“USAID”) for funds 
to pay claims when the FCA’s combat activity exclusion got in their way.39 
The USAID has supplemented the FCA (as well as military condolence payment programs) 
with its own aid programs when called upon to do so in Afghanistan and Iraq.40 Congress has 
subsequently authorized USAID to spend approximately $40,000,000 “to assist victims of U.S. 
military operations in Iraq”, and has likewise authorized $60,000,000 for the Afghan Civilian 
Assistance Program, which includes assistance for Afghani civilian victims of war.41 
The USAID, though, has made sure to distinguish its programs in Afghanistan and Iraq from 
the FCA by specifying that its assistance is not “compensation” (nor “reparations”).42 Instead, USAID 
funds are “provided through local contracts with local vendors to provide war victims with needed 
medical care, establish a livelihood, and/or rebuild homes destroyed by the war.”43 USAID’s primary 
role is focusing on long-term development, and relying on ad hoc assistance from USAID “is not a 
realistic way ahead, especially because the USAID does not operate in immature theaters” like 
Yemen, Somalia, and other countries where the U.S. military is engaged in operations against ISIS 
and other terrorist organizations.44 
C. CONDOLENCE PAYMENT PROGRAMS 
1. Solatia 
The term solatia is derived from the Latin term solatium (solace), and is defined as “anything 
that alleviates or compensates for suffering or loss”.45 Solatia payments, like other condolence 
                                                          
39 Id. at 338 
40 Id. (citing Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development, Report No. E-267-08-
002-P, Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Management of the Marla Ruzicka Iraqi War Victims Fund (2008)) 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 338-39 
45 Id. at 331 (citing Jacqueline H. Wilson, Blood Money in Sudan and Beyond: Restorative Justice or Face-Saving 
Measure? (Mar. 25, 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Georgetown University) 
https://m.repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/ 
handle/10822/709806/Wilson_georgetown_0076D_12674.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y) 
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payment programs, serve as expressions of sympathy only, and payment of solatia is not an admission 
of liability or obligation to compensate.46 This condolence payment program has its origins in the 
Korean War, and as such it is the oldest of the U.S. military condolence payment programs. 
During the Korean War, U.S. military commanders handicapped by the FCA’s combat activity 
exclusion began to offer cash and other gifts to civilians whose property had been damaged or whose 
loved ones had been killed, in line with local custom.47 These types of payments have, in fact, been 
utilized in almost every armed conflict since World War I as a way to get around the FCA’s combat 
activity exclusion: 
In Vietnam, U.S. Forces frustrated with the combat activity exclusion 
of the FCA began processing combat claims funded by “assistance-in-
kind funds” from Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. In Grenada, 
judge advocates frustrated by the combat activity exclusion worked 
with USARCS to establish a combat claims compensation program 
using funds from the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID). In Panama, the FCCs on the ground received DoD 
Operations and Maintenance Funds to pay combat claims, while the 
Department of State (DoS) set up its own combat claim program 
through a Letter of Instruction with the government of Panama 
covering a compensation system to be run by Panama and funded by 
the DoS.48 
 
Solatia payments are usually comprised of monetary donations, but because they are not 
necessarily intended to make a civilian “financially whole” like compensation payment programs, 
they might also include funeral flowers or another expression of sympathy.49 Solatia payments are 
drawn from operations and maintenance funds, which means that a U.S. military officer’s decision to 
offer a solatia payment means that those funds will not be available for use in some other part of the 
unit’s mission.50 
                                                          
46 See Adams, supra note 6, at 331 
47 See Khan & Gopal, supra note 1; see also Currier, supra note 10 (Noting that since the Korean War, “the U.S. 
military has realized that it’s often in its best interest to make symbolic payments for civilian harm, even when it 
occurs in combat.”) 
48 Adams, supra note 6, at 330-31 
49 Id. at 331 
50 Id. at 331-32 
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Despite their usefulness, solatia payments are not authorized to be paid out whenever 
necessary; the U.S. military makes a decision as to whether or not solatia payments will be made 
available to citizens each time the nation begins military operations in a country.51 When military 
operations began in Iraq and Afghanistan in the early 2000s, the U.S. military incorrectly determined 
that solatia payments were not customary for either country, so they were not authorized.52 As a result, 
no civilian payment program existed to offer condolences for civilians suffering losses due to U.S. 
military operations for the first four years in Afghanistan or the first five months in Iraq.53 
It is not clear how the U.S. military makes the decision as to whether or not solatia payments 
will be made available in a given country.54 In 2004, however, General Counsel to the Department of 
Defense responded to U.S. military troops’ requests for solatia authorization by issuing an opinion 
that solatia is appropriate under both Iraqi and Afghani custom.55 Thankfully, U.S. military troops 
who recognize the importance of maintaining positive relations with civilian populations have 
admitted to scraping together funds to make solatia payments before that authorization came.56 
Solatia payments offer a significant benefit in that they are not accompanied by any type of 
combat activity exclusion, so they can be distributed, for example, to civilians who are injured when 
U.S. military troops exchange gunfire with ISIS combatants. In addition, because the funds for solatia 
                                                          
51 Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict, supra note 37, at 3; see Adams, supra note 6, at 332 (Solatia 
payments are only authorized on a permanent basis in four countries: Micronesia, Japan, Korea, and Thailand.) 
52 See Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict, supra note 37, at 3; see also Adams, supra note 6, at 332 
(“Until 2004, the DoD specifically prohibited the use of solatia in Afghanistan and Iraq, having determined 
(incorrectly) that condolence payments were not a commonly accepted practice in these countries.”) 
53 Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict, supra note 37, at 3 
54 See Adams, supra note 6, at 332 (“One regulation refers to a Command Claims Service or USARCS as 
appropriate authorities. Another authoritative source refers to local commanders having the authority to determine 
the propriety of solatia in a certain country. In actual practice, the DoD General Counsel and U.S. ambassadors 
have also made solatia determinations in the past. Contradictory regulations and practice make it difficult to 
determine who truly has the authority to authorize solatia in a given country.”) 
55 Id. at 333 
56 Id. 
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payments come from operations and maintenance funds, there are few procedural obstacles to quick 
payment of civilian claims.57 
However, because solatia payments must be approved by a high-level authority in each 
country before they can be distributed, troops on the ground are left at a disadvantage when those 
high-level authorities mistakenly restrict those payments, as occurred in Afghanistan and Iraq.58  The 
solatia payment program (much like the FCA) also suffers from inconsistent administration because 
when a claim is denied under the FCA it should be referred for a solatia payment, but many U.S. 
military troops fail to do so, and instead deny valid claims outright.59 Furthermore, groups like ISIS 
“ignore country borders, making country-specific [solatia] authorizations less useful to commanders 
as U.S. troops [and drones] follow the fight.”60 
2. The Commander’s Emergency Response Program 
When the U.S. military found secret caches of millions of U.S. dollars that had been hidden 
by the Saddam Hussein regime, they put the cash to work for the Iraqi people by creating the 
Commander’s Emergency Response Program (the “CERP”).61 The CERP was designed to “allow 
commanders in Iraq to quickly respond to the needs of the local population, such as humanitarian 
relief and reconstruction projects.”62 CERP funds were authorized to be used as condolence payments 
                                                          
57 Id. at 334 
58 Id. at 333; see Idrees Ali, How much is an Afghan life worth? That depends, REUTERS (Mar. 20, 2017), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-afghanistan-civilians/how-much-is-an-afghan-life-worth-that-depends-
idUSKBN16R0A5 (U.S. military troops suffered from poor relations with Afghani civilian populations until 
solatia payments were finally authorized; before then, “the Taliban was gaining influence and goodwill by giving 
civilians money after fatal U.S. strikes”.) 
59 See Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict, supra note 37, at 6-7 (“Most of the cases we reviewed that were 
denied under the FCA combat [activity exception] were not referred for a condolence payment.” … For example, 
“an Iraqi civilian filed a claim under the Foreign Claims Act on behalf of his son. The son was returning from 
Jordan in his car when fired upon by U.S. forces. The son was killed and the car destroyed. He requested 
[$27,000] in compensation and was denied by an Army Captain who found that the claim arose from combat 
action. An Army witness notes in the claim that the incident “could be combat excluded” because it arose from an 
‘escalation of force.’ No referral to condolence is mentioned and no payment is made[, despite the fact that the 
claim was eligible for solatia payment.]”) 
60 Adams, supra note 6, at 318 
61 Id. at 334; see Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict, supra note 37, at 5 (CERP funds “can be paid out for 
death, injury, or property damage due to U.S. combat operations.”) 
62 Adams, supra note 6, at 318 
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in Iraq in September 2003, and in Afghanistan in November 2005.63 However, CERP condolence 
payments competed with other CERP projects like humanitarian relief and reconstruction, and this 
caused frustration among members of the U.S. military who hoped to use the funds to dole out 
condolence payments.64 
Once the secret cache of Hussein regime cash ran out, CERP evolved into an appropriated 
fund which was subject to annual congressional action.65 Because Congress now holds the purse 
strings, CERP funds are only available in any conflict zone on a temporary basis, subject to the 
legislative process and the political maneuvering and bargaining that accompanies that process.66 As 
a result of Congressional oversight and regulation, CERP funds are only to be used to make 
condolence payments if the claim is not covered by the FCA (most often because of the combat 
activity exclusion), but in practice this rarely happens and valid claims are denied outright, leading to 
further civilian frustration and resentment.67  
The CERP suffers from other drawbacks as well. Unlike solatia payments which can be 
quickly distributed by troops after an incident, CERP condolence payments can be distributed within 
several weeks after an incident, but because the claims are adjudicated by a Judge Advocate (like 
FCA claims), payments often take up to several months, depending on the Judge Advocate’s caseload 
and investigative abilities.68 This is especially frustrating considering the fact that CERP condolence 
                                                          
63 Id. 
64 See Id. at 334-35 (“One claims judge advocate explained his frustration with CERP as follows: ‘I lacked money 
because the vast majority of my brigade’s CERP funds went to various reconstruction projects. Understandably, 
my commander prioritized CERP funds for hospitals, schools, or power stations, at the expense of condolence 
payments. The perception was that fixing a school and employing Iraqi contractors allowed funds to go further 
than paying a widow for her husband’s death.’”) 
65 Id. at 335 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 336 (“[T]he local population does not care which U.S. law allows for payment of their claim, they simply 
want to be recompensed in some manner.” When the U.S. military fails to follow procedure, claims which are not 
valid under the FCA but are valid under solatia or CERP guidelines go unpaid.) 
68 See Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict, supra note 37, at 5 (Proactive investigation of claims is a rarity, 
not the norm.) 
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payments do not actually require a legal review and are viewed by some troops as “walking around 
money”.69 
Following the rise of ISIS in Iraq, Congress authorized up to $5,000,000 of CERP funds which 
had already been appropriated for use in Afghanistan in 2016 to be made available for use as 
condolence payments in Iraq.70 This diversion of funds to Iraq is a “tacit admission that the United 
States anticipates future collateral damage from operations in Iraq despite the previous ‘withdrawal’”, 
which is not surprising considering the heightened use of drone strikes to combat ISIS and similar 
groups.71 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
The U.S. military’s fragmented approach to handling civilian claims for damage to property 
and loss of life is implemented via compensation and condolence payment programs, the main three 
being the FCA, solatia payments, and CERP. These programs are designed to foster positive relations 
between the U.S. military and civilian populations, but because they are applied in such a piecemeal 
fashion and without any consistency, they often breed resentment among the foreign populations they 
are intended to benefit. The U.S. military has acknowledged the benefits of compensating civilians 
for their losses, but is yet to develop a coherent policy of programs that can adjudicate claims and 
provide compensation or condolence payments in a timely, organized, and consistent fashion. 
III. U.S. DRONE STRIKE POLICY: TARGETED KILLINGS 
The U.S. military’s use of drones to target members of terrorist organizations like ISIS with 
the specific intent to kill those members is referred to as “targeted killing”.72 Targeted killings have 
                                                          
69 See Adams, supra note 6, at 337-38 (Compare: CERP condolence payments are often reviewed by a Judge 
Advocate “because of the requirement that they be vetted for FCA applicability”, but a retired Marine colonel 
commented on CERP’s usefulness by saying troops “can respond quickly to things that come up …. You don’t 
have to put in forms and wait.”) 
70 Id. at 337 
71 Id. 
72 See Stephen Dycus et al., National Security Law 417 (6th ed. 2016) (A targeted killing is when “lethal force is 
intentionally and deliberately used, with a degree of pre-meditation, against an individual or individuals 
specifically identified in advance by the perpetrator. In a targeted killing, the specific goal of the operation is to 
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been used with increased frequency in the “War on Terror”,73 giving rise to questions concerning 
their legality under international law. International law subsists of two main schools of thought: 
Human Rights Law (“HRL”) and International Humanitarian Law (“IHL”) (also known as the Law 
of Armed Conflict (“LOAC”) or the laws of war). 
HRL governs governmental treatment of civilians during times of peace, and its concerns 
focus more on law enforcement policies, operations, and procedures than on military actions.74 IHL, 
meanwhile, is concerned with the conduct of governments and individuals in wartime and, in relevant 
part, is intended to limit the suffering of both combatants and civilians to only that which is “necessary 
to achieve the legitimate political goals of a conflict.”75 Traditionally, it has been widely accepted 
that HRL applies during times of peace, while IHL applies during times of war.76 However, there is 
a growing school of thought that HRL should apply during armed conflicts as well.77 Regardless of 
which body of law is used to evaluate the U.S. military’s treatment of foreign civilians, it is readily 
apparent that the U.S. military’s targeted killing program violates the main tenets of international law 
as viewed through the prisms of both HRL and IHL. 
A. TARGETED KILLINGS AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
1. Are targeted killings properly viewed through the HRL framework? 
                                                          
use lethal force. This distinguishes targeted killings from … law enforcement operations, e.g., against a suspected 
suicide bomber. Under such circumstances, it may be legal for law enforcement personnel to shoot to kill based on 
the imminence of the threat, but the goal of the operation, from its inception, should not be to kill.”) (quoting 
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Addendum: Study on Targeted Killings at 
5, U.N. DOC. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston)) 
73 See Micah Zenko, The (Not-So) Peaceful Transition of Power: Trump’s Drone Strikes Outpace Obama, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Mar. 2, 2017) https://www.cfr.org/blog/not-so-peaceful-transition-power-
trumps-drone-strikes-outpace-obama (Targeted killings in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia have increased from one 
every 5.4 days under President Obama to one every 1.25 days under President Trump.) 
74 See Dycus et al., supra note 72, at 420 (HRL “generally requires some kind of judicial procedure” before an 
individual is killed. “The law enforcement model under human rights law rests on a presumption of innocence, a 
preference for arrest and detention by due process, and an insistence on credible evidence and fair trial before 
judicial punishment.”) 
75 Id. at 277 
76 See Id. at 277-78 (The traditional view that the U.S. adheres to is that “during armed conflicts, the more general 
HRL gives way to the more specific IHL and its jus in bello principles.”) 
77 See Id. at 278 
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The argument as to whether HRL or IHL applies when analyzing U.S. targeted killings in 
foreign countries begins with a basic question: is the U.S. engaged in an “international armed conflict” 
with ISIS and other terrorist organizations? If so, the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
apply to govern the conduct of the U.S. military.78 However, the U.S. maintains that because ISIS and 
other terrorist organizations are “non-state actors”, the conflict cannot be categorized as an 
international armed conflict under the Geneva Conventions. 
Many scholars agree with that analysis and concur with the U.S.’s assertion that most 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions do not apply.79 This suggests that HRL should govern, because 
the U.S. is not engaged in an “international armed conflict” (words that give rise to notions of being 
at war with an enemy). Indeed, the European view is that HRL always applies regardless of this 
analysis, even alongside IHL on the battlefield, and the international legal community is beginning to 
show signs of agreement.80  
2. HRL standards for using force 
HRL views targeted killings as extrajudicial killings occurring outside of an armed conflict.81 
According to HRL, law enforcement during peacetime “rests on a presumption of innocence, a 
preference for arrest and detention by due process, and an insistence on credible evidence and fair 
                                                          
78 See Id. (“The extensive provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 apply only to armed conflicts of an 
international (inter-state) character, not to non-international armed conflicts … except for baseline, general 
humanitarian protections for victims of all armed conflicts found in Common Article 3.”) 
79 See Id. (“Because armed conflicts today frequently involve violent clashes between states and non-state actors – 
terrorists, insurgents, guerrilla groups, even pirates – the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols often fail to 
provide clear guidance for belligerents.”) (citing John B. Bellinger III & Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Detention 
Operations in Contemporary Conflicts: Four Challenges for the Geneva Conventions and Other Existing Law, 105 
AM. J. INT’L L. 201, 205-13 (2011)) 
80 See Id. at 424 (“[T]he International Court of Justice and other international courts have applied HRL in armed-
conflict settings. … Indeed, there is a growing tendency to apply HEL in armed conflicts, expanding the 
protections otherwise available to civilians and dis-armed combatants. … By contrast, the United States takes the 
position that during armed conflicts HRL gives way to IHL and its jus in bello principles.”); see also Adams, 
supra note 6, at 344-45 (“There is a trend in international law over the past decade to conflate human rights law 
with international humanitarian law, and a growing expectation that parties to an armed conflict comport 
themselves like a domestic police force as opposed to a combat force. The United States takes the position that in 
an armed conflict, international humanitarian law is the lex specialis”.) 
81 See Dycus et al., supra note 72, at 422 
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trial before judicial punishment.”82 Therefore, HRL requires that in order for a civilian to be lawfully 
killed by government action, the killing must be made in order to “defend persons from unlawful 
violence, to effect an arrest or prevent [an] escape, or to quell a riot or insurrection.”83 In addition, 
HRL forbids governmental killings “unless the government uses no more force than absolutely 
necessary as a last resort to defend a person from imminent unlawful violence. The right to use lethal 
force thus turns on the conduct, not the status, of the target.”84 
U.S. policies concerning targeted killings are unlawful under the HRL standard of using “no 
more force than absolutely necessary as a last resort to defend a person from imminent unlawful 
violence”.85 In McCann v. United Kingdom, 21 E.H.R.R. 97 (1996), the European Court of Human 
Rights was confronted with a situation in which plain clothed United Kingdom soldiers in the Special 
Air Service shot and killed three members of the Provisional IRA.86 The soldiers knew that the IRA 
members were planning to detonate a car bomb at that location using a radio-controlled detonation 
device, so the soldiers suspected that the car the IRA members had just parked was about to explode 
and they shot and killed the IRA members to prevent them from remotely detonating the bomb.87 
Bypassing the question as to whether or not the soldiers individually committed a human 
rights violation, the Court focused on “whether the anti-terrorist operation as a whole was controlled 
and organized in a manner which respected the requirements” of HRL.88 The Court found that more 
                                                          
82 Id. at 420 
83 Id. at 422 
84 Id. at 443 
85 Id.; see Daphne Eviatar, Trump’s New Shoot to Kill Drone Policy Breaks International Law, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 
2, 2017), http://www.newsweek.com/trumps-new-shoot-kill-drone-policy-breaks-international-law-675673 (The 
Trump administration “wants to remove the requirement in Obama’s Presidential Policy Guidance, or PPG, that 
the U.S. will only lethally target individuals off the battlefield if they pose a ‘continuing, imminent threat to U.S. 
persons.’ Although that policy stretched the definition of ‘imminence’ beyond any meaningful boundaries, it at 
least suggested a nod toward international law. The new guidance reportedly removes the imminence requirement 
altogether, allowing the U.S. government to kill ‘foot-soldier jihadists with no unique skills or leadership roles’ 
and regardless of what threat, if any, they pose. In other words, it doesn’t even pretend to comply with 
international legal limits.”) 
86 See Dycus et al., supra note 72, at 421-22 
87 See Id. 
88 Id. at 422-23 
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force was used than absolutely necessary, because the IRA members “might have been arrested or at 
least turned away at the border, perhaps rendering a subsequent use of lethal force unnecessary.”89 
Furthermore, even though the soldiers had definitive intelligence that the IRA members were going 
to detonate a car bomb, the Court questioned the soldiers’ use of firearms to kill the IRA members 
instead of incapacitating them via nonlethal wounding shots.90 
The U.S. targeted killing program, meanwhile, kills suspected terrorists who are thousands of 
miles away from the U.S. persons they target, and does so by destroying entire buildings at a time. 
Unlike the situation in McCann, where the soldiers had solid intelligence that the IRA members were 
about to detonate a car bomb, the U.S. military conducts targeted killings against suspected members 
of terrorist organizations, regardless of the intelligence at the time the strike is ordered.91 
It is hard to see how individual terrorists far from the U.S. civilians they might seek to harm 
pose an imminent threat of unlawful violence against U.S. persons. The U.S. military would argue 
that leaders of terrorist organizations who coordinate the activities of terrorists in the U.S. always 
pose an imminent threat to U.S. persons, but this stretches the definition of “imminence” beyond any 
meaningful boundaries.92 In addition, the U.S. now carries out targeted killings against low-level 
“foot soldier jihadists with no unique skills or leadership roles”, not just organizational leaders, so the 
imminent threat posed by these individuals is even further deflated.93 Furthermore, the U.S. military’s 
targeted killing policy selects targets not based on the threat level they pose, but rather, based on their 
importance within the structure of the terrorist network they are a part of, regardless of threat level at 
time of killing.94 
                                                          
89 Id. at 423 
90 See Id. 
91 See Eviatar, supra note 85 
92 See Id. 
93 See Id. 
94 See Luke Hartig, Trump’s New Drone Strike Policy: What’s Any Different? Why It Matters, JUST SECURITY 
(Sep. 21, 2017) https://www.justsecurity.org/45227/trumps-drone-strike-policy-different-matters/ (“Over 16 years 
of operations, our counterterrorism professionals have become adept at analyzing the structure of terrorist 
networks and targeting them based on the understanding that there are particular nodes that, if removed, could 
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In addition to violating the “imminent threat” standard, the U.S. targeted killing policy also 
violates HRL’s “no more force than absolutely necessary as a last resort” standard. In McCann, even 
though the soldiers had solid intelligence that the IRA members posed an imminent threat, the Court 
questioned the soldiers’ decision to shoot to kill and suggested that they might have instead shot to 
incapacitate the IRA members.95 The U.S. targeted killing policy utilizes drones with weapons 
capabilities much more destructive and powerful than that of a handheld firearm.96 If shooting to kill 
when an IRA member is known to pose an imminent threat is using more force “than absolutely 
necessary as a last resort”, then deploying a one hundred-pound Hellfire missile with a sixty-foot kill 
radius to lethally target a courier who poses no imminent threat to U.S. persons is a clear example of 
using more force “than absolutely necessary as a last resort” and the U.S. military’s targeted killing 
policy violates HRL standards. 
B. TARGETED KILLINGS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
1. Are targeted killings properly viewed through the IHL framework? 
The U.S. may not be engaged in an international armed conflict with terrorist organizations 
like ISIS and therefore subject to the full provisions of the Geneva Conventions, but it is engaged in 
an armed conflict of a non-international nature.97 Armed conflicts of a non-international nature can 
be properly viewed as falling within the purview of IHL,98 and the U.S. has adopted the position that 
the U.S. military’s activities related to the “War on Terror” are properly viewed through the IHL 
                                                          
have a devastating impact on the entire network. In many cases, those nodes may be couriers, bodyguards, or 
propagandists who, while lawful military targets under the laws of war, may not pose a continuing, imminent 
threat to U.S. persons.”) 
95 See Dycus et al., supra note 72, at 423 
96 See Carey Dunne, Just How Powerful is the Reaper Drone?, CO. DESIGN (Jul. 10, 2014) 
https://www.fastcodesign.com/3032885/just-how-powerful-is-the-reaper-drone (“[T]he Reaper, the most precise 
drone to date, has 100-pound Hellfire missiles, which obliterate anything and anyone within a 60-foot radius of an 
intended target. If a Hellfire Missile were dropped on Boston’s Fenway Park it could take out most of the baseball 
diamond.”) 
97 See Dycus et al., supra note 72, at 278 (Militaristic conflicts between states and terrorist organizations, 
insurgents, and the like can be defined as non-international armed conflicts.) 
98 Id. at 310 
ALandman National Security AWR Final Draft 22 
lens.99 Indeed, the prevalence of armed conflicts with terrorist and guerilla groups across the globe 
has led some countries to simply treat all armed conflicts as falling within the IHL framework.100 As 
mentioned previously, the traditional view amongst the international community was, until recently, 
that IHL applies during armed conflicts, while HRL only governs during times of peace.101 
2. IHL standards for using force 
The overarching goal of IHL is to limit civilian and combatant suffering to only that which is 
“necessary to achieve the political goals of a conflict.”102 In furtherance of that goal, IHL requires 
that the use of military force be based on the principles of distinction and proportionality.103 
Distinction requires the differentiation between civilians and combatants, with only the latter being 
valid military targets.104 Proportionality prevents the use of force which causes “incidental civilian 
casualties that are disproportionate to the military advantage from the operation.”105 
The principle of distinction requires that a military “never make civilians the object of attack” 
by targeting them directly,106 but acknowledges the reality of war by allowing for civilian casualties 
“incidental to a lawful military attack (collateral damage)” and even the direct targeting of civilians 
“for as long as they take a direct part in hostilities.”107 In the context of the global “War on Terror”, 
differentiating between innocent civilians (who cannot be targeted), civilians who are taking a “direct 
party in hostilities” (and therefore can be targeted), and combatants (who can be targeted) is crucial. 
                                                          
99 Id. at 443 
100 See Id. at 278 (“As things stand now, states and lawyers struggle to apply IHL to [non-international] conflicts, 
and state militaries may in practice simply treat all armed conflict the same. … IHL norms in international and 
non-international armed conflicts ‘have become nearly indistinguishable.’”) (citing Michael N. Schmitt, Targeting 
and International Humanitarian Law in Afghanistan, 39 Israel Y.B. on Hum. Rts. 307, 308 (2009)) 
101 See Dycus et al., supra note 72, at 313 (IHL “has evolved alongside domestic and other international law to 
govern the conduct of states and and individuals during armed conflicts”) 
102 Id. at 277; see supra note 75 
103 See Id. at 443 (“The use of force must be necessary to achieve legitimate military objectives and proportionate 
(e.g., the incidental loss of civilian lives must be justified by the legitimate military benefit of the attack).”) 
104 See Id. at 277 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 443 
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This differentiation is critical in determining who can be targeted in a drone strike – ISIS soldiers and 
terrorists themselves can obviously be targeted as enemy combatants, but what about civilian cooks, 
drivers, and even propagandists who support the fighters? 
The U.S. military’s targeted killing program fails to clearly distinguish between types of 
civilians and combatants, and thereby fails IHL’s “distinction” standard. During the second intifada, 
Palestinian groups carried out terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians and Israel responded by 
launching preventative strikes against suspected individual Palestinian terrorists.108 The Supreme 
Court of Israel, in HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel, 46 I.L.M. 375 
(2006), interpreted and applied IHL to determine when civilians are “taking a direct part in hostilities” 
and therefore become lawful military targets (and by analogy for our purposes, lawful targets of 
targeted killings).109 
The court stated that “hostilities” are acts “which by their nature and purpose are intended to 
cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the armed forces” or harm to civilians.110 The 
court explained that it is not necessary that the civilian use a weapon or bear arms in order to take part 
in “hostilities”, and taking a “direct part” in hostilities is something that can only be evaluated on a 
case-by-case basis.111 
However, the court did provide some general guidelines: a civilian is taking a “direct part” in 
hostilities when they collect intelligence on the army, transport combatants to or from the hostilities, 
or service or operate weapons for the combatants.112 In contrast, a civilian is not taking a “direct part” 
in hostilities when they sell food or medicine to combatants, provide general strategic analysis or 
                                                          
108 See Id. at 299 
109 See Id. at 300-09 
110 Id. at 303 
111 See Id. at 304 (The meaning of taking a “direct part” in hostilities is open to interpretation; “to restrict this 
concept to combat and active military operations would be too narrow, while extending it to the entire war effort 
would be too broad, as in modern warfare the whole population participates in the war effort to some extent, albeit 
indirectly.”) 
112 See Id. at 305 (All of those civilians are “performing the function of combatants.”) 
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financial support, or distribute propaganda supporting the combatants.113 Finally, the court declared 
that for purposes of the temporal requirement (for so long as they take direct part in hostilities), a 
civilian who has adopted the combatant organization as his “home” and committed multiple acts of 
“hostilities” loses their civilian protection status and can be lawfully targeted by military 
operations.114 
The U.S. targeted killing program is arguably unlawful under IHL’s “distinction” standard 
because it targets civilians who indirectly support ISIS and other terrorist organizations. Like Israel 
in Public Committee, the U.S. military’s targeted killing program seeks to eliminate terrorist threats 
in a preventative manner by targeting combatants who are thought to be planning future terrorist 
attacks against U.S. civilians. However, the U.S. military targets individuals who are not taking 
“direct part” in hostilities according to the court in Public Committee by targeting nodes in “terror 
cells” regardless of their combat functions, like propagandists and financiers.115 Although the U.S. 
military would likely argue that circumstances have changed because of the role propagandists play 
in stocking terrorist organizations’ ranks and calling others to commit acts of violence, the fact 
remains that the U.S. has broadened the definition of taking “direct part” in hostilities to include far 
more activities than those considered in cases like Public Committee. 
The U.S. targeted killing program is also unlawful under IHL’s “proportionality” standard, 
which requires that any incidental loss of civilian life “must be justified by the legitimate military 
                                                          
113 See Id. (If such persons are injured, however, the attacking military “is likely not to be liable for it, if it falls 
into the framework of collateral or incidental damage.”) 
114 See Id. at 306 (“[A] civilian who has joined a terrorist organization which has become his ‘home,’ and in the 
framework of his role in that organization he commits a chain of hostilities, with short periods of rest between 
them, loses his immunity form attack ‘for such time’ as he is committing the chain of acts. Indeed, regarding such 
a civilian, the rest between hostilities is nothing other than preparation for the next hostility.”) 
115 See Hartig, supra note 94 (We analyze the structure of terrorist networks and target individuals within those 
networks based on the impact their death would have on the network. In many cases, those individuals “may be 
couriers, bodyguards, or propagandists” who may not pose a continuing threat to the U.S.); see also Owen 
Bowcott, Is the targeting of Isis member Sally Jones legally justified?, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 12, 2017) 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/12/is-targeting-of-isis-member-sally-jones-legally-justified (Sally 
Jones was “an active Isis recruiter and propagandist … The reported death of her 12-year-old son, Jojo, alongside 
her also raises concerns about the legality of the attack because he would be classified as a non-combatant.”) 
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benefit of the attack.”116 Adhering to the principle of proportionality requires a judgment call every 
time a drone strike is ordered in close proximity to civilians, which is extremely common as ISIS 
strategically positions military targets in locations where drone strikes will unavoidably lead to the 
loss of civilian life.117 
In Public Committee, the court noted that finding the balance between civilian harm and 
military advantage is difficult, and gave as an example a terrorist sniper shooting at soldiers “from 
his porch. Shooting at him is proportionate even if as a result, an innocent civilian neighbor or 
passerby is harmed. That is not the case if the building is bombed form the air and scores of its 
residents and passersby are harmed.”118 Finally, the court noted that in questionable cases, a 
meticulous examination is required and the military advantage must be “direct and anticipated” 
because under international law “the ends do not justify the means.”119 
The U.S. targeted killing program fails to satisfy the IHL standard of proportionality because 
the U.S. military follows policy guidelines which fail to ensure that the legitimate military advantage 
gained by a drone strike exceeds the harm to civilians. President Obama’s Presidential Policy 
Guidance (“PPG”), which lays out guidelines for use of military force and has been largely adhered 
to by the Trump administration, states that lethal force can only be used when commanders on the 
ground can determine with “near certainty” that civilians will not be harmed in the operation.120 
                                                          
116 Dycus et al., supra note 72, at 443; see Khan & Gopal, supra note 1 (Under IHL, “it is legal for states to kill 
civilians in war when they are not specifically targeted, so long as ‘indiscriminate attacks’ are not uses and the 
number of civilian deaths is not disproportionate to the military advantage gained.”); see also Ben Jones, Despite 
Obama’s new executive order, U.S. drone policy may still violate international law, THE WASHINGTON POST (Jul. 
7, 2016) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/07/07/obamas-new-executive-order-on-
drones-means-the-u-s-may-still-violate-international-law/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.4e17aa33136f (IHL 
“requires proportionality (the foreseen harms of force do not outweigh the military objective it aims to achieve) 
and distinction.”) 
117 See Dycus et al., supra note 72, at 308 (Evaluating proportionality is a values-based test “based upon a 
balancing between conflicting values and interests”); see also Malley & Pomper, supra note 21 (ISIS has “hid 
among civilians, used them as human shields, and did what it needed to do either to deter coalition airstrikes or 
ensure they would come at high cost.… Exposing innocents to harm is at the core of their tactics.”) 
118 Dycus et al., supra note 72, at 308 
119 Id. 
120 See Hartig, supra note 94 
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In practice, this seemingly strong standard was found satisfied and a strike was ordered on 
two civilian homes after ninety-five minutes of drone surveillance “confirmed” intelligence reports 
that the homes were ISIS command centers simply by observing a “military-age male” opening a gate 
for a guest vehicle.121 No “overtly nefarious activity”, no weapons, and no individuals dressed as 
combatants were observed; the burden of proof had been on the civilians “to demonstrate to a drone 
watching them from above that they were civilians – guilty until proved innocent.”122 In this one 
instance alone, four civilians lost their lives and no military advantage was gained by the strike. It 
cannot be assumed that this was a remote occurrence; therefore, the U.S. targeted killing program 
fails the IHL standard of proportionality by failing to follow policy guidelines which ensure that the 
legitimate military advantage gained by a drone strike exceeds the harm to civilians. 
C. CONCLUSIONS  
The U.S. military’s targeted killing program is unlawful under both HRL and IHL. HRL 
forbids governmental killings “unless the government uses no more force than absolutely necessary 
as a last resort to defend a person from imminent unlawful violence”,123 but the U.S. military targets 
suspected members of terrorist organizations who are thousands of miles away from the U.S. persons 
they might target, and does so by destroying entire buildings at a time. This constitutes a heavier use 
of force than absolutely necessary, and the U.S. military has stretched the “imminent” standard 
beyond any meaningful boundaries.124 
Furthermore, IHL requires that a military’s use of force be “necessary to achieve legitimate 
military objectives” and that the force used be proportionate in terms of the military advantage 
outweighing harm to civilians.125 The U.S. military’s targeted killing program is unlawful under the 
                                                          
121 See Khan & Gopal, supra note 1 
122 Id. 
123 Supra note 84 
124 See supra note 92 
125 See Dycus et al., supra note 72, at 443 
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IHL framework because it targets civilians who are not taking a “direct part” in hostilities and fails 
to ensure that the military advantage of a drone strike outweighs harm to civilians. 
As a result, the debate over which body of law should apply in active combat areas (like Iraq 
and Syria) versus non-active combat areas (like Pakistan and Somalia) is irrelevant, because the 
targeted killing program is unlawful as currently applied in both arenas.126 
IV. CONDOLENCE AND COMPENSATION PAYMENTS TO CIVILIAN VICTIMS OF 
TARGETED KILLINGS 
 
As we have seen, the U.S. military utilizes a number of condolence and compensation payment 
programs to manage its relationships with foreign civilians and make amends for the harm caused by 
military operations and personnel. We will now consider the obligations the U.S. has to use those 
programs to aid civilian victims of targeted killings, examine how difficult it is for victims to access 
those funds, and make suggestions for improvement so that the U.S. military’s targeted killing 
program can be utilized in a manner which is wholly consistent with the military’s stated objectives. 
A. THE U.S. MILITARY SHOULD COMPENSATE CIVILIAN VICTIMS OF TARGETED 
KILLINGS, EVEN THOUGH IT HAS NO LEGAL OBLIGATION TO DO SO 
 
As mentioned previously, the U.S. is under no legal obligation to provide compensation to 
foreign civilians for collateral damage arising from legal activities during armed conflict.127 This 
includes civilian victims of targeted killings, because although we have concluded that the targeted 
killing program is carried out in an unlawful manner, the international community has not yet formally 
arrived at this conclusion.  
Despite the lack of a legal requirement to do so, the U.S. military should make compensation 
and condolence payment programs available to civilian victims of targeted killings across the globe. 
                                                          
126 See Creede Newton, Trump must make known ‘deadly’ changes to US drone policy: NGOs, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 
8, 2018) https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/03/trump-deadly-drone-policy-ngos-180307204617166.html 
(Discussing the debate concerning the application of HRL in non-active combat areas like Pakistan and Somalia 
and IHL in active combat areas like Iraq and Syria, and concluding that in “either scenario, drone strikes can 
violate international law.”) 
127 See supra note 5 
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The support of local populations is critical in the counterinsurgency context,128 and the U.S. can 
hardly maintain a favorable view amongst the international community if it tracks and attacks terrorist 
across the globe without taking responsibility for its actions when it causes harm to civilians in the 
process. 
Traditionally, the U.S. military has argued that condolence payments are not an admission of 
legal liability, which is critical in avoiding the accidental creation of a new legal norm obligating a 
country to pay for damage caused by its military.129 However, the international community is 
beginning to see military accountability to civilian populations as a standard which should be upheld 
and promoted, as evidenced by the growing consensus that HRL and its increased civilian protections 
should apply to govern military actions during all armed conflict.130 Additionally, the court in Public 
Committee even advocated the use of compensation payments to civilian victims of military 
aggression in the IHL context.131 This is especially significant given IHL’s reduced protections for 
civilians, as compared with HRL. Given this trend and the military benefits that accompany the proper 
use of compensation and condolence payment programs, it is in the U.S. military’s best interests to 
make these payment programs available to all civilians worldwide.132 
B. CASE STUDY: BASIM RAZZO 
When contemplating suggestions for improving the use of compensation and condolence 
payment programs, an examination of one civilian’s struggle to access these programs is helpful in 
identifying areas for improvement. After Basim Razzo’s house in Mosul, Iraq was destroyed and four 
of his family members were killed by a U.S. drone strike, he sought an explanation as to why his 
                                                          
128 See supra note 7 
129 See Adams, supra note 6, at 343 (“It is crucial to distinguish between condolence payments and compensation 
payments” in order to avoid creating a new legal norm “that there is an obligation to pay for combat damage.”) 
130 See supra note 77 
131 See Dycus et al., supra note 72, at 307 (After an attack on a civilian “suspected of taking an active part … in 
hostilities, a thorough investigation regarding the precision of the identification of the target and the circumstances 
of the attack upon him is to be performed (retroactively). That investigation must be independent. In appropriate 
cases it is appropriate to pay compensation as a result of harm caused to an innocent civilian.”) (Emphasis added) 
132 See supra Section II 
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family was targeted.133 He eventually learned that his family’s houses were mistakenly identified as 
ISIS command centers, and the faulty intelligence led to a U.S. airstrike that left him widowed and 
without a home in ISIS-controlled Mosul.134 
After recovering from his injuries, Basim sought a meeting with American military authorities 
to seek compensation for the losses he endured. Basim was not sure how much the U.S. military 
would offer, but he “had spent hours calculating the actual damages: $500,000 for his and [his 
brother’s] homes, furnishings and belongings; $22,000 for two cars; and $13,000 in medical bills 
from Turkey,” where he received medical care and recovered from the drone strike.135 Over a year 
after first contacting the U.S. Embassy in Iraq, Basim finally received an e-mail from the U.S. military 
which acknowledged the attack, apologized for the loss of life, and stated that the U.S. was prepared 
to offer a monetary expression of its sympathy and regret.136 
When Basim met with U.S. military representatives on March 17, 2017, an Army attorney 
started by saying, “We just wanted to start by expressing our deepest sympathies … We do take the 
closest care in what we do here, but it’s high risk, and sometimes we make mistakes. We try our best 
to prevent those mistakes, but we hope that since we did make a mistake here, we do everything we 
can to right it, as best we can.”137 Basim told the attorney that “[t]he only thing that cannot be returned 
is the loss of life,” but everything else could be rebuilt.138 The attorney told Basim that the U.S. 
military was prepared to offer him a condolence payment, which is “not meant to recompensate you 
for what you’ve lost, or for rebuilding or anything like that. It’s just meant to be an expression of our 
                                                          
133 See supra Section I at 3 
134 See supra Section III(B)(2) at 28 
135 Khan & Gopal, supra note 1 
136 See Id. (Also noteworthy is the fact that the U.S. military denied responsibility for the strike, despite being 
provided proof by the New York Times. The Times presented the military with a YouTube video uploaded by the 
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sympathy,” and offered Basim $15,000, which he said he was insulted by and refused to accept, 
bringing the meeting to a swift ending.139 
Even when the U.S. military took every step they thought necessary to demonstrate their 
sympathy towards Basim and explain the condolence payment to him, he still left the meeting feeling 
insulted. Despite the fact that Basim received an opportunity most civilians are never offered – an in-
person meeting with a military representative physically expressing remorse for the military’s actions 
– the process was not explained well enough to accomplish the program’s goals. Rather than fostering 
a positive relationship between the military and Basim, the administration of the condolence payment 
left Basim with the feeling that the U.S. had offered him a minimal payment which did not adequately 
address the military’s wrongdoing. 
Basim was never told that he was not eligible for a payment which would compensate him for 
what he had lost (because of the FCA’s combat activity exclusion); he was simply told that he was 
not being offered compensation for what he lost, but only an expression of the U.S. military’s 
sympathy. An explanation regarding the FCA’s combat activity exclusion may not have satisfied 
Basim that the U.S. military was properly “righting its wrongs”, but it would have done more to 
prevent him from feeling personally insulted by the military’s low offer. This example shows that 
even when the military makes a concerted effort to administer civilian payment programs in a sincere 
and heartfelt manner, the programs fail to accomplish their objectives and foster positive relations 
between the U.S. military and foreign civilians. 
C. A BETTER WAY FORWARD: PERMANENT PROGRAMS APPLIED CONSISTENTLY 
The U.S. military’s fragmented approach to handling civilian claims for damage to property 
and loss of life is administered in a piecemeal fashion and without consistency, leading to resentment 
among the foreign populations the programs are intended to benefit. In order to resolve this issue and 
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allow the programs to fulfill their intended purposes, civilian claims should be processed in a timely, 
organized, and consistent fashion. Claims arising from combat activities and non-combat activities 
alike should be awarded fair compensation in a structured system that does not allow claims which 
are eligible for one payment but not another to slip through the cracks. 
The solatia payment system and the FCA should be re-organized into a single program that 
does not require re-evaluation each time the military begins operations in a new country. ISIS and 
other terrorist organizations ignore country borders, and the U.S. military must be able to track and 
neutralize threats as efficiently as possible. As a result, it is imperative to quickly commence 
operations when necessary while maintaining the support of local populations so that they do not aid 
the enemy. This requires the ability to quickly process civilian claims without waiting for country-
specific authorization to do so.140 A permanent claims system which evaluates claims for both 
compensation and condolence payment eligibility would streamline the claims process and, by 
explaining that distinction to claimants, provide transparency that the current system lacks. 
In addition, the FCA’s combat activity exclusion should be eliminated so that innocent 
civilians who suffer debilitating property damage, like Basim Razzo, are eligible for full 
compensation for their loss. Although the FCA was designed to address problems caused by a 
different type of warfare in a distant era,141 its application to modern warfare requires modern 
adaptation. Similarly, the limitations on solatia payments should be enlarged or eliminated so that 
foreign civilians are not offered offensively low payments for the death of loved ones. Solatia 
payments should also be more regularly accompanied by an expression of condolences, determined 
by local custom, so as to communicate authenticity and sincerity.142 
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The consolidated compensation and condolence payment program should also be permanently 
financed by the Department of Defense as a part of its regular budget so that Congress cannot interfere 
with the program’s administration.143 The creation of a localized administrative body to handle claims 
quickly and efficiently would also streamline the process.144 Military experts and legal scholars have 
offered many more specific suggestions for the administration of such a consolidated program, and 
the Department of Defense would be wise to follow their suggestions.145 
V. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. military’s targeted killing program is unlawful under both the IHL and HRL 
paradigms. This unlawful program is unaccountable to civilian victims who are ineligible for 
compensation for damage caused by drone strikes. Furthermore, the use of condolence compensation 
programs to express sympathy for these civilian victims is wholly inadequate and often serves to 
breed resentment among the foreign populations they are intended to benefit. As a result, the U.S. 
military’s compensation and condolence payment programs require consolidation and modernization 
in order to fulfill their legitimate military objectives. 
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143 See Adams, supra note 6, at 367-68 (advocating for an overhaul of the compensation and condolence payment 
system and independent financing) 
144 See Id. at 363-65 
145 See Id. at 355-71; see also Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict, supra note 36, at 9-13 
